Short, honest write-ups of the ideas that come up in interviews and on the job. Each one teaches the concept properly, cites the Microsoft documentation, and points back to the class that drills it until it sticks.
Three letters that turn up on every architecture diagram and every security checklist, usually with no explanation attached. Here is what a WAF is, where it sits, the one OSI layer that makes it useful — and the honest reason turning one on is not the end of the story.
There is no WAF resource in the portal — it is a policy you attach to a fronting service. Where it can attach, the anomaly score that decides a block, the detection-then-prevention sequence that keeps you from 403-ing real customers, and how the cost is really structured.
The first time you go looking for WAF logs in Azure, you find nothing — and assume you're in the wrong blade. You're not. There is nothing there yet, and that is the whole answer.
Two managed web application firewalls that get compared as if they were the same product. They are not. One keeps everything inside Azure; the other is a global edge that happens to do a lot more than filter requests. The choice comes down to where your app lives.
Azure cloud security best practices for beginners: turn on MFA, use least-privilege RBAC, keep secrets out of code, lock down network exposure, and switch on the free Secure Score. The boring, high-impact list — not exotic tooling.
Application Gateway is a Layer 7 load balancer; its optional WAF adds policy-based inspection for common web attacks. Learn when it fits, how to tune it, and when Front Door is a better ingress choice.
Every Azure customer already has always-on DDoS protection at the platform level, at no cost — so the real question is not whether you are protected, but whether the paid tier buys you anything your workload actually needs.
The oldest sin in web apps is a password in a config file. Key Vault references delete it with no code change: the app setting stops holding the secret and starts pointing at it, resolved at runtime by a managed identity.
Most traffic is encrypted now, which is great for privacy and terrible for a firewall reading nothing. The Premium tier adds TLS inspection and a signature-based IDPS so it can open the tunnel and match what is really flowing against known attacks.
You need to let one client read one blob for one hour — without handing over the master key to your whole storage account. A shared access signature is exactly that: scoped, time-limited access baked into a URL.
"Is our cloud secure?" is really three questions — are we configured well, is our pipeline safe, are our workloads under attack? Defender for Cloud answers all three, and gives your posture a number you can move.
A connection string in a config file is a breach waiting for a git push. Key Vault is the central, access-controlled store those secrets go instead — so your code holds a reference, never the secret itself.